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Drawing from behavioral agency theory, this study examines three CEO succession scenariosâ€”established
CEOs, new outsider CEOs, and new insider CEOsâ€”and their effect on the strategic actions of firms
undergoing portfolio restructuring. I argue that a firmâ€™s restructuring strategies (i.e., the amount and type of
businesses sold) are contingent upon the individual CEOâ€™s problem framing and risk bearing and that board
independence moderates the relationship between the three CEO succession scenarios and a firmâ€™s
restructuring strategies. Results from 168 firms undergoing restructuring between 1985 and 2004 show that
CEO succession events and the successorâ€™s origin have a significant impact on both the level of divestiture
intensity and strategy change. The result also suggests that board independence, measured as the ratio
and equity ownership of independent outside board members, moderates a CEOâ€™s decisions regarding
types of businesses sold but does not influence divestiture intensity. This research adds to the succession
literature by demonstrating that succession consequences on organizations are affected by a CEOâ€™s
problem framing and risk perception. This research contributes to the behavioral agency theory by showing
that corporate boards do not always promote executive risk taking; rather, some forms of risk taking such
as divesting related businesses or significant downscoping activity would be discouraged by a more
independent board. 
